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Impacts of Climate Change on European Critical Infrastructures: The Case 
of the Power Sector 
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Anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases cause climate change and this change in turn induces 
various direct impacts, e.g., changes in regional weather patterns. The frequency of heat waves and 
droughts in Europe is likely to rise. Yet, beyond these immediate effects of climate change, there are more 
indirect effects: Droughts may cause water scarcity and a lack in water supply which in turn would affect 
further sectors and critical infrastructures. An arising lack in water supply for cooling purposes, for 
example, will negatively affect the electricity generation in power plants.  
In this paper we analyse such interplays between climate-change affected sectors. We investigate whether 
and to which extent power generation and supply in Europe is threatened by climate change because of 
the higher risk of water supply shortages due to more frequent drought and heat-wave incidences. Our 
proposed approach cannot only be applied to analyse the climate change effects on individual power 
plant sites or the overall economy but also on electricity exchanges between countries.     
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I.  Introduction: Climate Change, Energy Security and Critical 
Infrastructures 
As Bohi and Toman (1996: 1) point out, “[e]nergy security refers to the loss of economic welfare that 
may occur as a result of a change in the price or  availability of energy.” In general, the change in 
availability of energy influences the price of energy via market interaction (and vice versa), i.e. price and 
availability changes are interrelated. Yet, in many countries gas prices are indexed to the oil price, such 
that the gas price in these countries does not properly reflect potential shortages in gas supply. In the EU-
27, about 25 % of total primary energy supply is covered by gas (EC 2008c: 12). Furthermore, on the oil 
market the OPEC cartel has market power. Aspects like the latter are more explicitly addressed in the 
concept of energy security conveyed by the IEA (2007: 12) which states that energy insecurity “stems 
from the welfare impact of either the physical unavailability of energy, or prices that are not competitive 
or overly volatile”, i.e., market power negatively affects energy security.
1
                                                   
1 For a recent discussion of different concepts of and indicators for energy security, see Löschel, Moslener and 
Rübbelke (2010).  
 
Non-competitive prices are also a major concern of the EU, and one of the three main objectives of 
Europe’s energy policy as outlined in the European Commission Green Paper (EC 2006a) is to improve 
the competitiveness of the European internal energy markets; the other two objectives are sustainability 
and security of supply. Since competitive prices contribute to energy security, it is apparent that the EU’s 
individual energy policy objectives are closely related. In order to support supply security as well as 
competitiveness, a strong focus of the EU is put on investments in infrastructure in the shape of pipelines 
and grid interconnections (see EC 2008a).  
In recent years a major concern in the EU was also the critical infrastructure protection (CIP) against 
terrorist attacks and other security related risks. In 2004, the EC adopted a Communication, i.e., a pre-
legislative proposal, with the title “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against Terrorism” (EC 
2004)  and,  thereafter,  in 2005,  the Commission adopted a Green Paper  (EC 2005)  on a European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). In the Green Paper, the need to help reducing 
vulnerabilities concerning critical infrastructures was acknowledged. The threats are seen in terrorism, 
natural disasters and accidents; the risk of any disruptions or manipulations of critical infrastructures 
should be minimised. Consequently, while the initial focus of the emerging European CIP policy was on 
terrorism as a threat for disruptions, the policy evolved into an all-hazards approach. In December 2006, 
the European Commission adopted a Communication (EC 2006b) which describes the overall framework 
for EU-level CIP activities. 3 
 
The EPCIP consists of three main parts: 1) the Council Directive (EC 2008b) on the identification and 
designation of European CIs and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, 2) a financial 
programme, and 3) the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). “While the 
Directive constitutes the core of the programme, the other two components are foremost measures 
designed to facilitate the implementation of the Directive” (Lindström 2009: 38).  
The Green Paper (EC 2005) on the EPCIP adopts the principle of subsidiarity such that the EU would 
only be responsible for the CIP of those infrastructures whose disruptions would cause cross-border 
effects. Member States have to conduct CIP of those infrastructures whose disruptions would mainly 
affect the state itself, but their CIP is to be executed under a common EPCIP framework. Yet, the 
borderline between EU-wide critical infrastructures (CIs) and national CIs is a bit blurred (see also 
Pursiainen 2009: 724-725). The European Commission considers CIs to be European CIs, if they or 
disruptions of them significantly affect at least two EU member countries, while some critics suggested 
regarding only those CIs to be European CIs which involve three or more EU member states. In Council 
Directive (EC 2008b) on the identification and designation of European CIs and the assessment of the 
need to improve their protection, the European Council identifies energy and transport sectors as 
European critical infrastructures. Yet, the Directive also states that a step-by-step approach to identify and 
designate ECIs is pursued and that energy and transport sectors are those chosen in the first step. Other 
candidate sectors are 1) information, communication technologies, 2) water, 3) food, 4) health, 5) 
financial, 6) public and legal order and safety, 7) civil administration, 8) chemical and nuclear industry, 
and 9) space and research (see Annex 2 of EC 2005). 
The relevant sectors can be split into subsectors and in this paper the energy subsector ‘electricity 
subsector which includes infrastructures and facilities for generation and transmission of electricity in 
respect of supply electricity’ (see Annex I of EC 2008b) is of main relevance while in the water subsector 
we are mainly interested in water supply issues. More specifically, we are interested in the links between 
these two subsectors despite the fact that the common EPCIP framework which - according to the Green 
Paper (EC 2005) - has to define competences and responsibilities of involved agents, envisages to settle 
CIP principles on a sector-by-sector basis. On the one hand, as Fritzon et al. (2007: 32) stress concerning 
this sector-by-sector approach: “Such a strategy allows for CIP to be tailored to different CI needs and 
varying legal competences for CIP across the policy spectrum.” Yet, on the other hand, the fragmentation 
of regulations must not go so far that spillovers and synergies between different sectors become 
disregarded and will not be exploited. “Assessing the impact of systemic interactions is one of the most 
important but least understood aspects of modern risk assessment” (IRGC 2009: 25).  There are many 
examples of close relationships and interdependencies between different CIs. As Watts (2003: 559-560) 4 
 
explains, power grids might be affected by communication system disruptions (e.g., caused by terrorist 
attacks). Little (2002: 111) gives the example of failures in the communication system affecting the health 
sector. Svendsen and Wolthusen (2007: 44) refer to interactions between electric power grid and the 
telecommunications sector. De Bruijne and van Eeten (2007: 19) even stress that CIs “are becoming more 
dependent on each other’s ‘always on’ availability” and as a consequence these infrastructures have 
“become increasingly vulnerable to large-scale, cascading disruptions across sectoral boundaries”. Or as 
Kröger (2008: 1781) puts it: “recent decades have witnessed on the one hand a development towards a 
highly integrated system of interdependent systems, and on the other hand an increased social 
vulnerability in the face of loss of continuous operation”. He stresses that additional hazards and threats to 
CIs have also arisen.  
The main threat we regard in our analysis is climate change causing a rise in the frequency and intensity 
of heat waves and droughts in Europe. These heat waves and droughts will negatively affect water supply 
and – indirectly – power generation. It is this connection between water supply and power generation 
which is in  the focus of our analysis. By investigating the consequences of climate-change induced 
shortage of water supply (droughts), we follow the advice given by the OECD (2003: 50): “Attention has 
to be less focused on the occurrence and direct consequences of a hazard, and be more geared toward 
indirect cause-effect relationships, diffusion, and long-term effects.” While climate change is the initial 
effect induced by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, droughts are a successive indirect 




II.   Supply Disruptions in the Energy Sector  
It seems that on a global scale natural-disaster impacts on CIs might be of minor relevance if we take a 
look at the global oil market. Only five major disruptions can be observed on the oil market since the 
early 1990s: Hurricane Katrina (with a gross peak supply loss of 1.5 mb/d) in 2005, the war in Iraq (gross 
peak supply loss of 2.3 mb/d) in 2003, Venezuelan strike (gross peak supply loss of 2.6 mb/d) in 2002/03, 
the Iraqi oil export suspension (gross peak supply loss of 2.1 mb/d) in 2001 and the Gulf Crisis (gross 
peak supply loss of 4.3 mb/d) in 1990/91 (see IEA 2007: 37).  Hence, only one of the five major 
disruptions has been due to natural disasters or extreme weather events affecting the energy (oil supply) 
infrastructure. However, in the course of an ongoing climate change, the severity of such incidences and 
their effects on energy supply is likely to rise.  5 
 
On a geographically more limited scale, disruptions of energy supply induced by extreme weather events 
have been observed more frequently in the recent past. An obvious connection between weather extremes 
and energy supply is found in the hydropower sector. Hydroelectric power is the major source of 
electricity for 26 countries from the Sahel to southern Africa and the secondary source for further 13 
countries (Showers 2002: 639). Due to droughts, several areas in these countries from a wide range of 
climates were negatively affected by power shortages in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, water shortage, which 
is a threat that is probable to become more important in the course of climate change in many world 
regions, also negatively affects the power generation in fossil fuel and nuclear power plants. Such plants 
require water especially for cooling processes (Koch and Vögele 2009). As Förster and Lilliestam (2010) 
show, power generation could be severely constrained by typical climate impacts such as increasing river 
temperatures and decreasing stream flow. 
Consequently, water shortages do not only threaten electricity generation in developing countries, e.g., 
those located in Africa, but also the power generation in industrialized countries, e.g., those located in 
Europe or North America. According to the IPCC (2008a), the frequency of periods characterized by 
water shortages and by high water temperatures will increase in Europe and other parts of the world in 
future. Such a period has been experienced in Europe, e.g., during the summer of the year 2003, and it 
constrained the functioning of several power plants, e.g., in Germany (Zebisch et al. 2005: 51).  About 43 
% of the EU’s water demand is used as cooling water by power authorities (EUREAU 2009: 21).  
Consequently, climate change will affect the European CI ‘water supply’ infrastructure and 
simultaneously  –  due to the deficit of water supply –  the European CI ‘electricity generation’ 
infrastructure. In the European Union, 40 of the 110 existing river basins are international (EC 2007: 20) 
and hence these 40 basins meet the European CI criterion to concern more than one country. Due to the 
European transnational grids and the transnational transfer of power, a disruption in the power generation 
in one country may also affect other countries, i.e. more than one country is affected by, e.g., a shut-down 
of a power plant.  
As the EC (2007: 9) stresses “it is complex to establish European common indicators to describe 
droughts”. If prolonged drought occurs, a prioritisation of main uses should be established and for this 
objective, the EC (2007: 17) suggests employing impact indicators and among these proposed indicators 
are such reflecting impacts on socio-economic uses of water related to power production. As a means to 
deal with or prevent future water scarcity, the European Commission, e.g., intends to assess the need to 
further regulate the standards of water using equipment and water performance in different sectors (EC 
2009a: 11). As Pulido-Velazquez et al. (2008: 52) point out: ”The feasibility of water management 
strategies depends not only on the physic factors of the system, but also on their legal, institutional, 6 
 
environmental, and economic implications and constraints.” It is also suggested that adaptation measures 
related to water scarcity and droughts should be discussed in a transboundary and interdisciplinary 
context (EC 2009b: 100). The electricity sector itself also has options to adapt to climate change, but 
given the long lifetime of infrastructures and the magnitude of investments in the electricity sector, these 
adaptation options should be included already in today’s planning and strategies (BMU 2007: 2-3). 
 
 
III.  Impacts of Climate Change on Nuclear Power Plants and Electricity 
Supply in Europe 
In the summer of 2003, more than 30 nuclear power plant units in Europe had to reduce their production 
because of limitations in the possibilities to discharge cooling water (IAEA 2004). Some nuclear power 
plants got exemptions from legal requirements to be able to continue their operating activities. Currently 
nuclear power has a share of 28% in the electricity supply of the EU (Eurostat 2010). So disruptions in the 
use of the nuclear power plants may have significant impacts on the electricity supply system. In our 
analysis we will focus on this important subsector of energy generation. 
Based on expected changes in climate, we will assess the impacts of climate change on the electricity 
system taking into account country-specific shares of nuclear power in the electricity system and the 
exchanges of electricity within the countries. Fig. 1 gives an overview of the distribution of nuclear power 
plants in Europe.  
Nuclear power plants which had cooling problems in the past are highlighted. Most of the nuclear power 
plants in Europe are located in France. However, Germany, Great Britain and Spain also have a large 
number of nuclear power plants. The nuclear power plants with cooling problems in summer are mainly 
located in the south of Europe and onshore near big rivers.  
Despite the exemptions from legal requirements for some nuclear power plants, the whole electricity 
exchange system was affected by the limitations in the production possibilities of the power plants: As a 
result of the cooling problems of the nuclear power plants in 2003, France as the biggest electricity 
exporter had to import electricity from Great Britain to be able to supply enough electricity to Italy and 
other countries (UCTE 2004). The situation in 2003 shows that a heat wave in Europe can have a negative 
effect on the electricity supply system. Taking climate change into account, the question arises, if the 
situation of 2003 will become the norm or will still remain a more or less unique situation.  
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Fig. 1: Nuclear power plants in Europe 
 
Remarks: Red: Nuclear power plants with cooling problems in recent years. 
 
In the following, we will present an approach which allows us to analyse the impacts of climate change 
on the electricity supply system in Europe. The possible effects of climate change on power plants and 
other water users have been analysed in several papers (see, e.g., DOE/NETL 2007; EPRI 1995; Förster 
and Lilliestam 2010; Hurd and Harrod 2001; Koch and Vögele 2009; Müller, Greis and Rothstein 2007). 
In contrast to these studies, we want to present an approach that cannot only be applied to analyse the 
effect on individual power plant sites or the overall economy but also on electricity exchanges. Using the 
example of nuclear power plants in Europe, we will use this approach to point out possible impacts of 
changes in air and water temperatures on the European electricity exchange structure.  
 
III.1 Description of the Theoretical Approach 
To be able to assess the impacts of changes in humidity, air and water temperatures as well as in the 
availability of freshwater on production processes in thermal power plants it is necessary to analyse the 
freshwater demand of the power station that is needed to run the station without cooling constraints. The 
demand for freshwater of a thermal power plant can be calculated by  8 
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where  Q
F:    cooling water demand [m
3] 
  KW:     installed capacity [kW] 
  h:     operation hours [hours] 
  3.6     factor to convert kWh to megajoules 
  ηtotal:   total efficiency [%] 
  ηelec:    electric efficiency [%] 
  α:    share of waste heat not discharged by cooling water [%] 
  β:    share of waste heat released into air [%]  
  ω :     correction factor accounting for the effects of changes in air temperature 
and humidity within a year  [–]   
  ϑ:    water density [t/m3] 
  c:    specific heat capacity of water [MJ/t K]. 
  AS:    permissible temperature increase of the cooling water [K] 
  EZ:     densiﬁcation factor [–]  
(Koch and Vögele, 2009)  
If no cooling tower is used, the waste heat will be released into the receiving surface water. Using a 
cooling tower, the waste heat will be released mainly into the air. In this case, the demand for cooling 
water results from losses of water evaporated in the cooling tower. The amount of evaporated water 
depends on air temperature and humidity as well as on the freshwater which is needed to prevent the 
build-up of minerals and sediments in the cooling cycle. The impacts of cooling  water shortages or 
limitations on the increase in water temperature can be assessed by transforming equation 1 to  
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Assuming limitations in the available amount of cooling water  (
F Qmax)  and a lower permissible 
temperature increase of the cooling water (ASmax) the capacity has to reduced to  9 
 






















where    KWmax:   usable capacity [kW] 
 
Fig. 2 shows the relation between possible electricity production and permissible water intake for a 1200 
MW nuclear power plant with a closed-circuit cooling and for a power plant with a once-through cooling 
system. Usually with higher air temperatures the evaporation and therefore the demand for freshwater 
increases. If the permissible water intake cannot be extended, the power plant has to reduce its 
production.  
 
Fig. 2: Permissible water intake and electricity production  
1200 MW Nuclear Plant 
Once-Through Cooling System 
1200 MW Nuclear Plant 
Closed-Circuit cooling System 
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Usually there are several legal constraints for power plants regarding the temperature of the discharged 
water. So power plant operators are not allowed to discharge water with a temperature above 28/30°C 
(once-through cooling system) or 35°C (closed-circuit cooling system) and not more than 10°C warmer 
than the water temperature of the river the cooling water is discharged in. A low permissible temperature 
can be compensated with a higher volume of cooling water. Again, if the amount of permissible water 
intake is constrained the power plant has to reduce its production.  










+ =                     (4) 
where  Ts:  stream water temperature [°C] 
  Tα:  air temperature [°C] 
  μ:  estimated minimum stream temperature [°C] 
  α:  maximum stream temperature [°C] 
  γ:  steepest slope of the function [°] 
  β:  air temperature at the inflection point [°C] 
(Mohseni, Stefan and Erickson 1998).  
Besides the analysis of the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to changes in air and water temperatures, 
we investigate how climate-change induced modifications of the power plant´s production affect the 
European electricity exchange system. Regarding the influence of changes in electricity production on ex- 
and imports of electricity we assume that individual countries adjust their electricity exports by the same 
rate at which their imports have changed.  
 
III.2 Model Specification 
Our example is based on the electricity supply and exchange situation of August 2007 (IAEA 2004; 
UCTE 2008). Using a climate change scenario of IPCC we analyse what will happen to electricity 
production and exchange if air temperature changes as expected in this scenario. 
In 2007 Germany, France, Great Britain, Spain and Italy had the highest shares of electricity generation in 
Europe. In Germany, Italy and Great Britain the demand for electricity was higher than the domestic 
production in the summer months. So they had to import electricity. Most of the electricity that these 
countries needed was provided by France (see Fig. 3). 11 
 
Fig. 3: Net-electricity production and electricity imp-/export in the year 2007 
 
Source: ENTSO-E (2010)  
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Usually nuclear power plants are inspected, maintained and refueled each year. If the power plant 
companies choose July or August to do this, they can avoid cooling problems. According to data of 
IAEA, we assess the potential to do this for France with 8 GW, for Germany with 3.5 GW and 0.5 for 
Switzerland, Spain, Czech Republic and Hungary (IAEA 2008). Based on data of WORLDCLIM we 
extracted data for the air temperature of each power plant site and calculated water temperatures.  
The climate change scenario corresponds to a projection of the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling 
and Analysis (CCCMA) for the “A1” emission storyline of the IPCC. In this storyline a rapid economic 
development with strong attitudes to market-based solution is assumed. As one result of the increase in 
CO2  emissions,  the air temperature in Europe in  the  summer  will rise by 3°K  on average  (see 
Govindasamy, Duffy and Coquard 2003; WORLDCLIM 2010). 
If the climate changes as Govindasamy, Duffy and Coquard (2003) expect, especially in the south of 
Europe air and therefore also water temperatures will increase significantly (see Fig. 4). Due to a lack of 
data and in order to limit the complexity of our study, we have to make several assumptions:   
 
a)  In our approach we assume that all nuclear power plants have the same efficiency. In addition, we 
assume an EZ (densification factor) of 3 for all power plants with closed-circuit cooling system.  
b)  The demand for reserve capacities and the load still remain on the level of 2007. 
c)  In the reference situation enough water is available to use the power plants without any 
constraints. Additionally we assume that at the individual power plant sites the permissible water 
intake cannot be expanded.   
 
The parameters for the air/water temperature relationship are derived from the literature (Morrill, Bales 
and Conklin 2005; WWF 2009). Besides air and water temperature data, information on the availability of 
freshwater is necessary to identify which power plant will get cooling problems if climate changes. 
Because such data is not available for each of the power plant site we analyse three different scenarios: 
The first one reflects the situation of August 2007. In the second one (scenario “climate change + slight 
water scarcity”) we assume an increase in air and water temperatures with no extension of the water 
intake.
2
                                                   
2 To run the power plants without any limitations on the production on average about 15% more water will be 
necessary.  
 In the third scenario (scenario “climate change + more serious water scarcity”) we assume that 
10% less water than in the second scenario will be available.  
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Fig. 4: Air temperature in Europe  
Average max. air 






(tmax) in Europe 
2050 (August) 
 




The reference situation presented on the top of Fig. 5 reflects the exchanges of power plant capacities in 
Europe on August, 15th 2007 at 11.00 am according to data published by UCTE (2008). Assuming an 
increase in air temperatures as Govindasamy, Duffy and Coquard (2003) expect, less power plant capacity 
will be available in France due to cooling problems. Although the vulnerability to climate change can be 
reduced by changing the inspection and maintenance periods of critical power plants to summer time 
France will have to reduce its exports of electricity. In our calculation nuclear power plants in Germany 
and Switzerland will also face cooling problems. In contrast to France and Spain, these countries are able 14 
 
to postpone the inspection and maintenance periods of all critical power plants to August. So the changes 
in air and water temperatures will have no direct impacts on electricity exports of these countries.  
 
Fig. 5: Load flows (day) on 3
rd Wednesday of August at 11:00 a.m. CET in MW 
 
Reference Scenario (August, 15
th 2007) 
 
Scenario “Climate Change +Slight Water 
Scarcity” 
Scenario “Climate Change + More Serious 
Water Scarcity” 
   
Source: (UCTE 2008), Own Calculation 
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Taking into account that Switzerland as well as Germany and other countries depend more or less on 
electricity imports from France, these countries will also have to reduce their electricity exports due to the 
reduction in the imports from France. Thus, in the second scenario, the changes in the electricity 
exchange system mainly result from constraints of the power plants´ output in France and Spain.  
The third scenario shows the situation where additional water shortages are taken into account. Besides 
France and Spain also Switzerland will have to limit nuclear production. All in all, electricity exports will 
decrease significantly. As the example of the Netherlands shows, not only the direct neighbours of France 
will have to look for ways to reduce the supply gap but also countries which depend indirectly on 
electricity from France. Taking electricity import dependency shares into account especially Italy will 
have problems meeting the demand for electricity if no direct or indirect measures are taken. Other 
countries will have fewer problems because of their low electricity import share. 
 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
Climate change does not only threaten critical infrastructures directly, but there may also be follow-up 
effects negatively affecting downstream infrastructures. In our analysis we regarded the follow-up 
consequences of climate-change induced shortages of water supply for cooling purposes in nuclear power 
plants. In the future, the threat of water shortages affecting the cooling processes of power plants will 
become a very important issue. Apart from countries with a high nuclear power production share, 
countries which depend on electricity imports like the Netherlands will also be affected by climate 
change.  
In order to address the threat of a climate-change induced shortage of electricity supply, there exist two 
different general strategies or climate policies: “Societies can respond to climate change by adapting to its 
impacts and by reducing GHG emissions (mitigation), thereby reducing the rate and magnitude of 
change” (IPCC 2008b: 56). In fact, on the one hand, nuclear power generation is a low carbon option for 
producing electricity and can hence be seen as a climate change mitigation option if it replaces power 
generation options using more carbon-intensive fossil fuels like coal or oil. On the other hand, due to the 
ongoing climate change the European nuclear power sector necessitates adaptation policies.  These 
adaptations have either to be placed in the sector itself or in the upstream water supply sector. Put 
differently, we may especially distinguish between the following two adaptation categories: 1) improving 
the management of the upstream critical infrastructure in the shape of water supply (many European river 
basins are transnational and therefore an international coordination is required in many cases), and 2) 
improving the management of the downstream critical infrastructure in the shape of electricity generation 16 
 
in power plants. Our analysis focused, in turn, mainly on the second category of adaptation options in 
order to prevent follow-up effects of deteriorations in water supply.  
On the one hand, increases in power plant efficiencies as well as replacement of power plants with power 
plants which do not need a cooling system (e.g., photovoltaic installations) can contribute to reduce the 
effects of climate change on the electricity supply system. On the other hand, simultaneous changes in the 
demand for electricity, e.g., due to an increase in the use of air-conditioning, and the concurrent 
construction of wind-power plants on sites with poor wind conditions in summer will even worsen the 
situation. Yet, all in all, with coordinated measures of the partners of the European electricity supply 
system the effects of climate change on the electricity system could be limited. These coordinated 
measures involve aspects of electricity supply as well as demand and water management to reduce man-
made water shortages and the heating up of rivers. 
It has also to be taken into account that the considered climate-change induced problems involve 
international dimensions. A large share of European rivers, and hence water supply from these rivers, are 
transnational. Thus, improvements of the management of water resources necessitate to a large extent a 
European coordination in order to be effective. Furthermore, due to the European trade of electricity, 
deteriorations in the production of electricity will affect a wide range of European countries. Both 
considered critical infrastructures, water supply and electricity production, therefore, exhibit properties of 
European critical infrastructures and the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection may 
provide some assistance to protect them. Yet, overlaps  of this programme with other European 
regulations, e.g., with the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD), should be taken into account and 
synergies should be exploited. One of the WFD´s objectives is to contribute to mitigating the effects of 
floods and droughts  (EC 2000) and consequently the WFD pursues also the protection of critical 
infrastructures. 
Finally, it has to be highlighted that our calculations are based on the assumptions of unchanged load and 
unchanged use of other power plants. In the past, the plant operators were able to manage disruptions of 
electricity supply by importing electricity from other countries or using reserve capacities. But even the 
association of transmission system operators for electricity, Entso-E, finds it hard to provide exact figures 
for each country on spare capacities ( UCTE, Etso, Nordel, ATSOI, BALSTO and UKTSO 2007). 17 
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